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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction: 
Before 1953, Cambodia was colony by French almost one century. In 1947 
Cambodia declared first Constitution under the help of French’s rulers. Under this 
Constitution, Cambodia formed a monarchy with two parliaments, the National 
Assembly and the Popular Assembly. All members of these parliaments were elected 
by general elections. Four year terms for members of National Assembly and two 
year terms for members of Popular Assembly. The Constitution of 1947 stipulated 
that all powers issued from the King. These Constitution was amended and became 
the second Constitution in 1957. The 1957 Constitution guaranteed Cambodian 
people of basic rights such as freedom of belief, the freedom of speech, writing, 
printing, meeting and assembly, Cambodia enjoyed economic prosperity and security 
under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk as Head of State. But 1960 the 
economic progress was downed. 
On 18 March 1970, Sirik Matak and General Lon Nol made a coup d’etat 
ousted Prince Sihanouk from the power and formed new government named the 
Khmer Republic in October 1970, General Lon Nol was a President. Khmer 
Republic introduced a new Constitution that president controlled all executive power 
and commanded the national armed forces. After ousted from power, Prince 
Norodom Sihanouk fled to China and formed forces to fight against Lon Nol’s 
regime supported by United States. Communist forces in Cambodia, which had 
emerged in 1968, joined Prince Norodom Sihanouk to form the National United 
Front of Kampuchea. Cambodia’s civil war was started, this conflict and social 
insecurity made Cambodian economy downed. The Lon Nol regime had no stability 
and the power was not strong. 
The Khmer Rouge took Phnom Penh on 17 April 1975 and formed the new 
government named Democratic Kampuchea under the leadership of Pol Pot called 
Saloth Sar. The Khmer Rouge regime followed a Maoist communist system 
promoted ultra-collectivism, the Central Committee of Khmer Rouge regime led by 
Pol Pot controlled all the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary. The Khmer 
Rouge regime abolished all market economy and business activities. The Khmer 
Rouge regime was supported by China, many Cambodian People were killed, 
especially educated people, professionals, military officers, and policemen in 
previous regimes. The Khmer Rouge brought Cambodia back to “ year zero ”. 
The Khmer Rouge regime was ended when Vietnamese troops and 
Cambodian resistance forces supported by Vietnam entered into Cambodia expelled 
the Khmer Rouge regime from power on January 7, 1979. After escaped from 
Phnom Penh, but still occupied some areas along the Cambodian-Thai border and 
continue the civil war. The Khmer Rouge also continued to hold Cambodian seat at 
the United Nations. A new government was established in Phnom Penh named the 
“People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK)”, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic 
(USSR) was a major assistance for People’s Republic of Kampuchea. The People’s 
Republic of Kampuchea was led by Mr. Heng Samrin as head of state and president 
of the parliament. Beside making laws, the National Assembly had the power to 
expel and elect the president, vice-president, and members of the State Council and 
Council of Ministers. The People’s Republic of Kampuchea was controlled by the 
communist party, named the people’s Revolutionary Party of Cambodia and then 
became the Cambodian People’s Party. 
The reconciliation process began between Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and 
Prime Minister Hun Sen in 1987. The People’s Republic of Kampuchea was 
renamed the State of Cambodia in 1989 and 50,000 Vietnamese troops finally 
withdrew from Cambodia. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
officially arrived on March 1992. The United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia’s mission assisted in the governance of the country until general elections 
could be held. In May 1993 general elections were held under The United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia, Khmer Rouge party denied the result of the 
election and continue their fighting in the jungle until 1998. No any party could get 
enough votes to form the government alone, so a new coalition government was 
formed among the three major political parties, the arrangement of two co-prime 
ministers and also co-ministers of Defend and Interior. 
A new constitution was established in 1993. The new government 
implemented the liberal democratic state and the market economy as the foundations 
of Cambodian political and economic future. King Norodom Sihanouk is a symbol 
of Cambodian Unity, but he doesn’t have powers in policy. The second general 
election was held in 1998, three parties received seats in the National Assembly, Pol 
Pot the top leader of Khmer Rouge died in 1998, this event made Khmer Rouge 
solders integrated with new coalition government and finished the three decades of 
Cambodian civil war. 
Now the main issue for the Royal government of Cambodia is the reform as 
the Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen  said that Reforms are a life and death issue 
for Cambodia. 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO  
Reform of Public Administration :  
The public administrative reform is not new issue for the Royal Government of 
Cambodia. The first government between 1993 to 1997 issued statements about 
administrative reform. The project of administrative reform were supported by aid funds 
such as United Nations Development Program and European Union. The Government 
prepared a revised plan for public administrative reform. 
    
2-1-Civil Administrative Reform  
On February 1999 a five-year program (1999-2003) of national administrative 
reform was presented by the government to aid agencies at Consultative Group Meeting. 
The first objective of Cambodian civil administrative reform plan is to “create a State 
administration that is neutral, closer to people, transparent, responsible, and responsive 
to the needs of the people”, the Royal government of Cambodia focus on the 
establishment of good governance for administrative reform in Cambodia. There are 
four key strategies were planed by the government for civil administrative reform first 
rationalize the size of the civil service, second create a more professional, effective, and 
responsible administration with adequate remuneration for civil servants, third 
implement a modern management system to improve human resources within the 
administration, fourth implement de-concentration and decentralization of the 
government.          
 
2-2-Institutional Framework for Administrative Reform 
The Council Administrative Reform tried to coordinate the Government’s 
administrative reform, an inter-ministerial body was established by a sub-decree in June 
1999. The Council Administrative Reform led by the Senior Minister in charge of the 
Office of the Council of Ministers and assisted by a secretariat. The Council 
Administrative Reform always organizes meeting with aid agencies. The capacity of the 
Council Administrative Reform is inadequate to carry out the administrative reform 
program has confirmed by the Donor Sub-Group on administrative Reform.  
The Secretariat General of the Council Administrative Reform is led by a Secretary 
General and has 11 full-time staff since March 1999. According to the Government, 
there are 24 ministries and state secretariats created administrative reform working 
groups to coordinate reforms within their respective ministries/agencies. These 
ministries working groups meet with the Secretariat General of the Council 
Administrative Reform to disseminate information and consider policy initiatives.  
On October 27, 1999, the Government signed a sub-decree to create a council for 
“anti-corruption” by cooperated with the Secretariat General of the Council 
Administrative Reform. There are some representatives from concerning ministries and 
others authorities also joined with the Council.  It was not clear what the unit authority 
will implement, and the role between the unit authority and the respective jurisdictions 
of the Ministry of Parliament Affairs and Inspection, each ministries have its own 
department of inspection. The overlapping functions, competition for authority of 
budgetary resources and inconsistent actions is very real possibility. It is not easy for the 
council to implement anti-corruption in Cambodia because all members of this new 
body have other positions in the government.  
 
2-3-The program of Civil administrative Reform : 
There are two components serve as the foundation for the Government’s 
administrative reform plan: a civil service census and a functional analysis of the 
public sector. The civil service census’s preparation have began in August 1999 with 
the development of the initial work plan. In October 1999 the census questionnaire was 
contributed to central and provincial representatives. The questionnaires collected 
personal data on each civil servant and immediate family as well as educational 
information, language skills and experience of job. The census conducted by one 
hundred staff drawn from all ministries with support from the World Bank. The process 
include several layers of validation and control prior to issuance of an identification 
card. The card also included a photo, fingerprint, and bar code recorded in a central 
computer system to prevent double entries and allow for cross-checking information. 
There was a specific schedule for implementation of the census by ministry and 
province. The Government completely finished the census on March 2000 for the 
central administration and on June 2000 for the provinces. The International Monetary 
Fund had made completion of a civil service census one of the structural performance 
criteria for its new, three years Enhanced Structural Adjustment facility arrangement 
with Cambodia. 
 The second key activity of the administrative reform program is a functional analysis 
of each ministry. This activity began with an analysis of the Council of Ministers, State 
Secretariat of Civil service, and Ministry of Rural Development and gradually expand to 
cover all ministries. The Government intends the functional analysis was completed by 
June 2000. The Government commended for pushing forward with these two 
fundamental tasks in the administrative reform program despite the current scarcity of 
resources. The civil service census and functional analysis are intended to establish the 
basis for the reorganization of ministries and professionalization of administration in 
Cambodia together. There are five ministries are using the system to date for their 
payroll. The progress had been made in the establishment of a computerized human 
resource management information system that includes a payroll system and personnel 
database. In order to ensure the validity of ministry payrolls, instating the computerized 
payroll system will now be synchronized with completion of the civil service census. 
This will prevent the system from simply computerizing the existing, unreliable, and 
perhaps “ghost-ridden” payroll records used by ministries. At the moment, some 
individual ministries maintain their own payroll systems. Many ministries do not know 
the exact number of civil servants in their pay include personnel departments have weak 
control over the rosters and no knowledge of number of personnel being paid in the 
provinces. United Nation Development Program is the main agency to support for these 
administrative reform beginnings. The Government is also starting to downsize, though 
on a modest scale to date. Government issued a sub-decree to enforce the mandatory 
retirement age of 55 for civil servants. The meeting with Donor Monitoring on October 
1999, the Government reported to reduce the civil service by over 2000 personnel since 
July 1999, half were retirees and other half irregular cases. Downsizing is one element 
of the Government’s administrative reform program. Aid agencies have long called for 
cuts in the size of Cambodian civil service. The administrative reform strategy and 
program that includes annual downsizing is one of the structural benchmarks included 
in International Monetary Fund’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility arrangement. 
The reduction of civil servants from the public payroll was a required prior action for 
approval of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility by International Monetary 
Fund’s Executive Board. The International Monetary Fund urges deferring any general 
increase in civil service wages until a concrete plan for downsizing is adopted. 
The administrative reform program’s future components include the creation of a 
“core group” of civil servants working in priority sectors of government who can lead in 
the implementation of reform measures, or change management as it has been termed. 
In preparation for this action, Council Administrative Reform is planning a study to 
identify priority government missions and mechanisms to identify the core group. The 
plan also calls for the reclassification of civil servants and development of 
socioeconomic measures to help integrate “excess” civil servants into the private sector. 
The Government also wants to change the legal framework for administration in 
Cambodia. This includes sub-decrees on the organization and functions of all ministries 
and state secretariats. Legal training of civil servants and standardization of 
administrative documents are also planned. 
Strengthening the legal framework for public administration could also include a new 
governing the civil service in Cambodia to change the outdated Law on Civil Servants 
which will not be suitable for the redesigned administration that the Government is 
planning. Basic responsibilities and internal procedures for managing the civil service, 
including promotions, suspensions, and termination, should be defined in a law enacted 
by the National Assembly. The Government has mentioned the drafting of a document 
that will be officially adopted describing the “obligation” of all civil servants. Adoption 
of a manual to promote common administrative practices among public institutions was 
held in November 1999. However, the basic legal obligations and rights of civil servants, 
including proscribed activities and due process requirements for administrative practices, 
should be the subject of a law, not merely a governmental regulation.  
There has been relatively modest progress with administrative reform thus far. 
However, the renewed initiative only began recently, and the government is proceeding 
at the moment with little financial support from aid agencies. It suggested that its 
“major achievement” in administrative reform to date is the establishment of the 
Council Administrative Reform, its Secretariat General, and other institutional 
structures within ministries.  
2-4-Civil Administrative Reform Issues: 
The Government developed broad “ownership” of the reform initiatives. This issue 
involves the extent to which the planning of reforms reflects a consensus within the 
Government concerning major policies and elements of reform programs as well as the 
depth of political will, understanding, policy ideas, and commitment to implementing 
plans. The plan tabled by the Government at the Consultative Group Meeting resembles 
the original program for public administrative reform pursued unsuccessfully in 1995-
1997. United Nations Development Program developed project documents for a second 
major administrative reform project which were finalized shortly. Discussions did not 
reveal any appreciable differences between the original Public Administrative Reform 
and the new Public Administrative Reform. However, the small group of senior officials 
responsible for overseeing the administrative reform program expresses strong feelings 
of ownership for the program and underscores the multi-ministry composition of the 
Council Administrative Reform. These are important factors that were not present 
during the first administrative reform program from 1995-1997. 
Good governance has been described at the same time as one of the four components 
of the administrative reform plan as well as one of the three cross-cutting themes for 
activities in all the components during the different phases of the plan. According to 
some, past discussions of administrative reform, as with other reforms, illustrated a 
worrying tendency to focus on funding. This has been mentioned as a cause of concern. 
In particular, it was noted that discussions of reforms, particularly in presentations by 
the Government, Government needs for funds from aid agencies and less on basic 
policy questions, developing mechanisms to ensure accountability and transparency, and 
sequencing of actions to provide confidence that actions in fact match commitments. 
Downsizing of the civil service appears to be upper most in the minds of aid agencies. 
Some of them seem to give little attention to other key issues in the administrative 
reform program. This may be true because downsizing produces measurable results. 
Reforms aimed at restructuring administration or changing government process and 
practices, which are more important in the long term, are more difficult to quantify. 
However, some government officials did not view downsizing as a top priority in the 
civil service reform.  
 
CHAPTER THREE  
Military Reform : 
Since 1995-1996 Cambodian armed service reform has been a major discussion point 
between the government and the aid community. The military needs to adjust to a new 
role after the end of internal armed conflicts and the Government need to increase 
public investment in social sector, government has focused this issue at the top of the 
reform agenda. Even though the progress of these reforms were slowed, there was a 
consensus on the need to both reorganize the military and reduce its size. Despite had 
some obstacles, however the mobilization program is moving forward.  
3-1-Structure of Institution 
There are two high level institutions have been created to plan, coordinate, and 
oversee reform of the military: the Council of Armed Forces Demobilization and 
Council of Reform of the Royal Armed Forces. 
The Council of Armed Forces Demobilization is chaired by the Senior Minister in 
charge of the Office of the Council of Ministers and comprised of senior officials from 
eight ministries and the armed forces. The Council, which reports to the supreme 
Council of State Reform, is charged with initiating and overseeing the demobilization 
process. 
 The Council of Reform of the Royal Armed Forces is chaired by the co-Ministers of 
Defense and primarily consists of senior military officers. Its mission is to reform the 
military consistent with objectives set by the Supreme Council of State Reform. The 
Council reports to the co-Ministers of Defense and is assisted by several commissions 
and sub-commission on demobilization.  
The relationship and divisions of authority between these military bodies on 
demobilization were unclear. It appeared that the Council and a Secretariat General, 
comprised entirely of military personnel, are responsible for implementation of the 
registration process and delivery of identification card.  
3-2-Military Reform Program: 
At the February 1999 Consultative Group Meeting, a plan for demobilization of the 
armed forces entitled the Cambodia Veterans Assistance Program was presented by 
Government to aid agencies. The original the Cambodia Veterans Assistance Program 
was prepared by the Government, and technical was supported by the World Bank 
during the 1995-1996 period, but was delayed preparations in 1997 because of factional 
conflict. There are four phases of the Program: registration, demobilization, reinsertion, 
and reintegration. 
The first phase, registration, concerning with identification and data collection of all 
soldiers, issuance of identification cards, and creation of a personnel data base. The 
second demobilization phase involves the disarmament, health screening, discharge, and 
assisted dispersal of demobilized soldiers to host communities. Phase three, reinsertion, 
focuses on the provision of a safety net of basic goods, food, shelter, clothing, education, 
household items, local transportation to demobilized soldiers. In with the plan has 
presented in early 1999, a lump sum payment of $1,200 per veteran was vetted by the 
World Bank as the safety net. The reinsertion phase was intended to last between six 
and eight months. The last phase, reintegration, includes counseling, facilitation of 
access to land and credit, vocational training and other educational opportunities, 
support to special target groups such as disabled veterans and war widows, community 
services, and the development of veterans associations. Reintegration assistance would 
be provided during the first 12 months after discharge. Information, counseling, and 
referral services, however, would be available throughout the five-year the Cambodia 
Veterans Assistance Program period. 
Provincial committees monitored implementation of the demobilization program in 
their respective provinces. In addition, the national Executive Secretariat has established 
provincial veterans offices, comprised of staff from the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Labor and Ministry of Woman’s and Veteran affairs, to execute the Cambodia veteran 
Assistance Program. Specifically, these provincial veterans offices would be in charge 
of finance, administration, monitoring, and community outreach activities. The 
relationship between provincial veterans offices comprised of ministry staff and which 
receive funds from and report to the Executive Secretariat and provincial committees. 
According to the original Cambodia Veteran Program, demobilization would be a 
five-year process of demobilization. 
The Government reported that the registration of 140,693 military personnel was 
completed in December 1999. The Government had reported identifying a large number 
of “ghost” solders and “ghost” dependents, some 15,551 and 163,346 respectively, 
during the registration process. The aid agencies did not observe the detailed 
information on the registration process, was not disseminated. 
The second step in the demobilization process is the development of a Pilot 
Demobilization Program to test mechanisms, assess program needs, or allow for 
redesign based on a smaller scale demobilization of 1,500-2,000 solders in several 
provinces. The Government has completed a draft project document for the 
demobilization program. There are four provinces Kampot, Kampong Thom, 
Battambang and Banteay Meanchey were identified for implementation. 
One key goal of the Pilot Demobilization Program will help structure an effective an 
effective resettlement process that meet the actual needs of demobilized solders and 
their families. The World Bank said that “ Drawing lessons from experiences under the 
pilot demobilization, the transitional safety net, its level and composition, may need to 
be reformulated prior to general demobilization”. In truth, the safety net was not formed, 
based on any specific socioeconomic data for Cambodian soldiers to be demobilized, it 
seems to follow or import from demobilization efforts in other countries without any 
reference to the situation in Cambodia. 
Due to differences over the composition of the safety net for the reinsertion phase of 
demobilization, the actual safety net will be determined after gathering more 
information on the needs of demobilized soldiers and experiences in implementing the 
Pilot Demobilization Program. There is inadequate information on the needs of soldiers 
to be discharged, including needs of special target groups such as widows and child 
soldiers. Aid agencies confirmed that compiling a basic socioeconomic profile of 
households for both soldiers to be demobilized and host communities is a priority. One 
element of the Pilot Demobilization Program might be an individualized needs 
assessment for major support such as the provision of land or farm animals before a 
final determination is done. 
Among the aid agencies, the tabling of a dollar amount for the transitional safety net 
caused much disagreement. Some of Aid agencies have opposed this approach because 
it creates unrealistic expectations based on incomplete information and uncertain 
funding levels. The Government and the World Bank were not enough consultation for 
design of the plan. Following on past experiences with the return of refugees to 
Cambodia in the early 1990s, most aid Agencies as well as the Prime Minister placed 
greater importance on the reintegration assistance than the transitional safety net has 
provided during the reinsertion phase of demobilization. It is very important for aid 
agencies and the Government to take account of experiences with reintegration and 
lessons learned during the early 1990s.  
 
3-3-Military Reform Issues: 
Initial implementation of the Government’s military reform program illustrated 
another governance issue involving the speed of reform. The Government clearly wants 
to demonstrate its political will, capacity, and results in the implementation of the 
military reform. However, the Government often takes crucial first steps too quickly 
without first establishing the overall policy framework and mechanisms needed to 
ensure transparency and maintain the confidence of its aid partners. 
Experience with the first phase of the demobilization program, the registration 
process was good example for this issue. In April 1999, aid agencies stressed the 
urgency and current “vacuum” with regard to the monitoring of the registration process 
given the short time available. At the same time , they recognized the need for highly 
qualified expertise that agencies lacked. The Donor Sub-Group on Demobilization later 
noted that the lack of response to requests for information on the registration process. 
This left the impression among aid agencies that the Government was seeking to lock in 
the transitional safety net a $1,200 per solder amount vetted, imprudently and 
prematurely, by the World Bank. 
More importantly, even though a recognized need for experts to monitor registration, 
the critical element of the demobilization process, it showed that monitoring by both 
civilian officials and aid agencies was insufficient. The senior military officials were 
unable to provide any information when were asked that what extent the registration 
was monitored.  
The action of aid agencies contributed to this situation. In their haste to reduce the 
size of Cambodian military and reapportion the military’s share of the national budget, 
they concentrated too much on demobilization and not enough on helping the 
government, especially the armed forces, establish an overall vision of a new structure 
and functions. Aid agencies erred by pushing demobilization without the policy 
framework for military reform in place.  
Aid agencies raised this point at meetings of the Donor Sub-Group on 
Demobilization and with the Government directly, apparently with little impacted on the 
current process that continued to move ahead without a policy on military reform. The 
demobilization process started before any coherent vision for the military’s future 
structure and responsibilities was developed. In addition, the policy framework was 
lacking, and the Ministry of National Defense, with assistance from the Government of 
Australia, prepared a Defense White Paper completed in the first half of 2000. The 
action of aid agencies had the perverse effect of cutting off serious discussion within the 
Council of Armed Forces on Demobilization about alternative to the cash payment 
transitional safety net that they will withdraw later. By prematurely tabling a specific 
amount before any assessment of needs and existing resources of individual soldiers, 
they caused certain members of the Council to reject outright consideration of non-cash 
alternatives. 
Certain members maintained that aid commitments to cash payments meant that 
consideration of alternative safety net system was unnecessary. So, discussions were 
effectively cut off, despite many aid agencies were in fact uncomfortable with a cash 
payment system based on past experiences in providing such lump sum payments to 
returning refugees in the post-Paris peace Accords period. Similarly, some senior 
military officers oppose entirely the idea of cash payments to demobilized soldiers, 
expecting widespread squandering of money by individuals inexperienced in managing 
money. 
There is a second, unintended result of discussions of troop reductions without a 
policy framework for reform. The number of soldiers remaining after demobilization, 
based on negotiations, may far exceed the ultimate needs of the Cambodian military. 
Some senior military officials have privately expressed the opinion that troop reductions 
should be 50 percent larger than the range currently have been discussed. 
The lack of an overall reform policy for the armed forces has in turn impacted 
planning for demobilization. Military officials raise the possibility of a 20-30 percent 
reduction of troops in each province. An across-the –board reduction, though easiest to 
plan, may not serve the long-term interests of military reform.  
In the absence of a clear policy framework, it has been easy fro both the aid agencies 
and Government to gravitate toward paths of least resistance.  
 
3-4-Transparency of the Military’s Role in Demobilization: 
The institutional structure for the Government’s demobilization program did not 
clearly define the division of labor and authority between the various institutions 
involved in the demobilization process. Coordination between the two Councils 
concerned is obviously essential. There had no identifiable mechanisms to ensure 
transparency of the activities of the Council of reform of the Royal Armed Forces and 
various sub-bodies such as the Demobilization Commission. It was unclear how these 
military bodies are accountable to the civilian authorities of the Government. According 
to its sub-decree, the Council of reform of the Royal Armed Forces has to report only to 
the co-Ministers of National Defense, who are also its co-chairpersons. On the other 
hand these military bodies in charge of reform were not explicitly accountable to 
anyone outside the armed services. 
Notably, none of these military bodies communicated directly to aid agencies through 
the quarterly donor monitoring meetings of aid agency working subgroups. Aid 
agencies mentioned the lack of commitment and participation of “stakeholders” such as 
the armed forces in the planning process or “stakeholders” such as aid agencies in the 
implementation process for demobilization. In October 1999, a meeting was organized 
by the Donors’ Demobilization Working Group and the Council of Armed Forces 
Demobilization, there had no representative from the Ministry of National Defense, 
only one member of the Council itself, the Minister of Woman’s and Veterans Affairs, 
was present at the meeting. It was one of difficulties for aid agencies not to mention the 
public in assessing the progress of demobilization and accessing information generally 
about specific activities to implement military reform program including demobilization. 
Such issues had been arisen. 
Information on the registration process had not been made readily available to the 
Donors’ Demobilization Working Group. Registration is the foundation upon which the 
whole demobilization process rests. Any loss of confidence in the registration process 
and result due to inadequate transparency would jeopardize the integrity of the 
demobilization process and possibly cost the Government financial and technical 
support. 
In general, the military seems strangely absent from the discussions on 
demobilization. Certain senior military officials seemed uninformed about the 
demobilization plans and process. They had suggested contacting one civilian official 
on the Council of Armed Forces Demobilization. It had appeared important information 
and communication gap exist. It also appeared that “ownership” of the demobilization 
effort may not be broad-based with the Government. 
 
 3-5-Preparedness in the Provinces for Demobilization 
According to senior military officers, provincial governments knew little or nothing 
about plans of demobilization, even though the fact that demobilization occurred almost 
in the whole provinces. This was confirmed by the provincial governors and deputy 
governors. Moreover, the plans for demobilization stressed the role of provincial 
veterans offices in the reintegration of demobilized soldiers and their families. These 
plans also call for provincial rural development committees to help supervise the 
reintegration process. So, implementation of the demobilization program relied to a 
large degree upon the capacity of provincial governments to manage major elements of 
the program. 
In many respects, demobilization was a major exercise in decentralization. It requires 
provincial governments to shoulder new responsibilities involving thousands of people 
in a potentially long, complex program of resettlement, vocational training, land 
distribution, community relations, infrastructure development, conflict resolution, 
education, and financial management. Preparing for the implementation by provincial 
veterans offices and supervision by provincial rural development committees of the 
demobilization program was not easy task. At the moment, provincial authorities were 
uninformed of their future role and lack the human resources to handle it. 
It is very important for the demobilization pilot program to concentrate heavily 
during the preparatory stages on strengthening the preparedness and human resources of 
provincial officials for their duties. In particular, there is an acute need to include 
broader participation of local government and non-government organizations in the 
demobilization planning and project design processes. It is not only increase 
transparency but also allowed the Government to tap the expertise, experience, and 
information gained by officials and others working in the provinces. And it also 
provided critical information on the economic realities that thousands of demobilized 
soldiers will face. It was not clear that actual economic and agricultural conditions or 
prospects have adequately considered in the reintegration planning. It was not clear to 
what extent soldiers are already reintegrated into local communities. These issues are 
relevant not only to the composition of the safety net but also directly linked to the 
design of training programs associated with demobilization as well as community-
oriented support and programs for employment creation. These issues require more 
attention and planning. Aid agencies recognized this crucial issue. The Donor Sub-
Group on Demobilization highlighted the need for the Government to conduct major 
preparatory work in each province included in the pilot program. Even though had some 
difficulties but Government implemented the pilot demobilization program at the end of 
year 2001 Government was successful demobilized 15000 soldiers. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Reforms of Public Finance 
The Government’s efforts to reform public finance is a policy focus throughout the 
economic transition of the last decades. The agenda and priorities for reform changed 
from time to time. The transition started in earnest in 1989-1991 when the state of 
Cambodia faced a drop of foreign assistance from the former Eastern Bloc, mainly from 
Soviet Union. Lacking alternative sources of finance, it financed the deficits through 
monetary financing, and inflation has started. The rate of inflation was around 150 
percent in 1990. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia operations in 
1992-1993 inflation rates continued to persist at high levels of more than 100 percent. 
In 1993, the newly established Government faced a major economic challenge 
containing inflation. The Government launched a major public finance reform through 
the Organic Budget Law adopted by the National Assembly in 1993. Public finance 
reforms under the 1993 Organic Budget Law showed effective in fighting inflation. In 
1994 inflation rates begin declining and were kept below an annual 10 percent rate from 
1994 to 1997. Its effectiveness had also showed after mid 1997 when twice shocks hit 
Cambodia’s economy, domestic conflict in July 1997 and the Asian financial crisis. In 
the face of the twice crises, the Government kept inflation from 9 percent and 13 
percent in 1997 and 1998.  
Although effective in sustaining fiscal discipline, the 1993 Organic Budget Law and 
its institutional arrangements posed major challenges. The World Bank has described 
that one of the fundamental problems is “ the Cambodian budgetary process sacrificed 
so much in terms of allocative and technical efficiency to maintain aggregate fiscal 
discipline. The Government also faced a challenge on the revenue side of public finance. 
Despite its ongoing efforts, Cambodia’s revenue-raising capacity has been very week. 
Public revenue remained around only 9 percent relative to Growth Domestic Products 
between 1995 and 1997, and even declined in 1998. Although Cambodia has the 
potential to raise up public revenues significantly, some deficiencies in institutional 
arrangements hindered the effective capture of potential revenues. 
Public financial reforms regained momentum after the formation of a new 
Government in November 1998.  
 
4-1-Institutional Framework for Public Finance Reform 
The Government has identified public finance as one of the four key areas of reform 
since 1999 Consultative Group Meeting. It was planned to establish a Council of 
Economic and Financial Reform under the Supreme Council of State Reform. Until now, 
the Government is still drafting the organic sub-decree for its establishment. Despite 
delays in the establishment of the Council, public finance reform appeared to have been 
undertaken vigorously under the initiative of the Ministry of Economy and Finance.      
 4-2-The Program of Public Finance Reform  
The Program of Public Financial Reform was proposed by Ministry of Economy 
and Finance focused on two areas of reforms, firstly, revenue-enhancing measures, 
secondly, measures to improve expenditure management. 
Revenue-enhancing measures: 
Tax revenues 
As part of the implementation on the Law on Taxation, Since January 1999 the 
Government has introduced value-added taxes. The Value-Added Taxes has replaced an 
earlier turnover tax and consumption tax, and its rate was set at ten percent. The Value-
Added Taxes was applied to around 1,500 large firms with variable taxable income. The 
list of taxpayers subject to Value-Added Taxes was expanded towards the end of 1999 to 
broaden the tax base. According to a senior official of the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance, some 2,000 companies would be covered, and geographical coverage 
expanded to include five provinces: Sihanoukvill, Koh Kong, Siem Reap, Kampong 
Cham, and Battambang. 
In addition to the Value Added-Taxes, Ministry of Economy and Finance has taken 
several measures to strengthen tax collection. The Ministry of Economy and Finance 
has added 50 tax officials more at the Department of Taxation to meet increasing needs 
for tax experts. They were transferred from other departments within Ministry of 
Economy and Finance. It has also carried out on-the-job training in auditing at the Audit 
Office of the Department of Taxation. 
Other measures were reported at the recent Consultative Group Meeting and donor 
monitoring meetings without assessing their progress, including: strengthening the 
discipline of tax officials, cleaning up the Department of Taxation, avoiding ad hoc tax 
exemptions outside the Law on Investment, and applied strict measures to recover 
arrears from taxpayers or withholding agents.  
Customers revenues 
Customs duties (foreign trade taxes) are a major source of public revenue for 
Cambodia. Before introduction of the Value-Added Taxes in 1999, customs duties 
accounted for more than 50 percent of all tax revenue. The Government has launched 
pre-shipment inspection ( PSI ) services to enhance the capture of customs duties and 
facilitate foreign trade in 1995. PSI services were provided by a Swiss-based private 
company, SGS under direct contract with the Government.  
Despite its revenue potential, the capture of customs revenue has not shown 
significant progress in recent years. Customs revenues remained within the range of 
Riels 75-100 billion during 1996-1998, without any increasing. This contrasts sharply 
with a steady upward trend of domestic tax revenue. An abrupt suspension of PSI by 
SGS in July 1999 reportedly caused considerable disruption to customs operations. With 
the SGS dispute unresolved, the Government launched an open tendering process to 
resume PSI in the near term . In sum, there was a wide scope for improvements in 
customs revenue, although the 1999 budgetary target for customs revenue appears to be 
achievable. In addition to resuming PSI in 2000, the Government identified a variety of 
measures to strengthen customs administration, including: 
- widely disseminating the customs code and relevant regulations 
- streamlining and simplifying clearance procedures 
- computerizing customs operation 
- implementing a staff roster system, and  
- upgrading human resources through promotions, discipline, motivation, and 
training. 
Recognizing the problem of widespread smuggling, the Government also has 
declared that it would strictly implement measures to crack down on contraband, 
while taking stringent disciplinary actions against customs officials involved in 
illegal activities.  
Non-tax revenues 
The Government has completed a full transfer of garment quota management fees 
and all revenues from quota auctions to the Treasury by October 1999. Revenues 
from this was transferred by the Ministry of Commerce are used to reduce the 
Government’s net debt to the National Bank of Cambodia as a result of monetary 
financing of budget deficits in 1998. This measure has contributed significantly to 
the increase in non-tax revenues in 1999. It is very important measure, the full 
transfer from the Ministry presents an excellent model that other ministries should 
follow. 
The Government also implemented measures to increase other non-tax revenues 
such as timber royalties, lease of enterprises, and post and telecommunications fees. 
In addition the Government also took measures to improve poor management of 
state-owned assets, especially enforcing a direct transfer of rental income to the 
Treasury. Despite occasional warnings by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, 
line ministries sold or rented state-owned assets to the private sector without 
transferring the proceeds to the Treasury. In April 1999, the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance has issued an inter-ministerial circular to improve implementation of 
the prime Ministerial Order on the State Assets Management. This Circular required 
all contracts related to the lease or sale of state-owned assets to include a clause, 
direct transfer of rental income to the Treasury. After this measure was introduced in 
April 1999, the income of rent increased sharply. The Government also 
strengthened the recovery of arrears that are estimated to total Riels 6.2 billion for 
the lease of state-owned assets, and Riels 50 billion for telecommunication 
companies. 
  
Measures to improve expenditure management: 
Improving efficiency in the budgetary process  
One of the urgent issues of public finance reform is to improve efficiency in the 
budget process. Disbursements to priority sectors such as education, health, agriculture, 
and rural development have been extremely slow and unreliable. These sectors under 
spend their allotted budgets each year. This issue is addressed, the impact of public 
expenditures on poverty alleviation and human resource development will remain poor. 
At the quarterly Donor Monitoring Meeting in October 1999, the Minister of economy 
and Finance summarized the situation saying, “ while the fiscal reforms have yielded 
some positive results on the revenue side, the public expenditure management has been 
less encouraging”. A Nobel Peace Prize laureate NGO working in the health sector, 
Medicins Sans Frontieres, has informed the Government that it would withdraw from 
Cambodia if expenditure management issue did not addressed urgently. 
To address the issue of the budgetary process, the Government has undertaken 
reforms primarily through three policy instruments: an Accelerated District 
Development system, Priority Action Program, and law on Financial Procedures and 
Provincial-Municipal Properties.  
Health is one sector in which the Government, was supported by aid agencies and 
NGOs concerned, tried to decentralize finance responsibilities. The Ministry of Health 
and its network of provincial and district health officials have little authority over 
budget and spending decisions related to the provision of health services in the 
provinces. The Ministry of Economy and Finance has to approve any use of public 
funds by the Ministry of Health’s provincial health departments. Most funds are 
channeled through provincial treasuries, not through the Ministry of Health which in 
effects has no control over its budget. 
This process hinders both the planning and implementation of health care policies, 
leaving actual spending on health programs outside the control of the Ministry of Health 
and its provincial officials. During the first nine months of 1999, only 28 percent of the 
budget contributed for public health disbursed. Spending in 1999 in agriculture, rural 
development and social affairs was similarly behind budget. Among other things, this 
situation showed the costs of overly centralized governance to the delivery of public 
services to the people. 
In 1996 the Accelerated District Development system was introduced for the health 
sector. It gives program managers at rural public hospitals and health centers greater 
certainly in the availability of funds and greater flexibility in the use of funds. Program 
managers receive a fixed cash advance from the Ministry of Economy and Finance via 
the Ministry of Health for operational cost, from which they have discretion to 
contribute funds for predetermined, specific purposes such as patient food, emergency 
patient transport, and building maintenance. The Accelerated District Development 
system operated in 22 districts covering 3 million people in rural areas. The 
disbursement record of the Accelerated District Development system, however, has 
been unimpressive. In 1999 the Government doubled the Accelerated District 
Development budget to Riels 6 billion ($1.6 million). 
The Priority Action Program is an instrument to ensure the disbursement of budget 
to priority sectors in the face of revenue shortfalls. In the Priority Action Program, 
program inputs and outputs are made clear by identifying various indicators at the 
programming stage. Indicators used to monitor the execution of programs. In the year 
2000 budget, implementation of the Priority Action Program planed on an experimental 
basis in five line ministries covering health, education, agriculture, rural development, 
and public works. 
Since the 1999 Consultative Group Meeting. The Government has repeatedly 
expressed its willingness to embark on gradual decentralization of the budget system. 
This is intended to rationalize the roles of the central and provincial administration, and 
also to improve technical and allocative efficiency of the budgetary process. One key 
reform measure is the enactment of the Law on Financial Procedures and Provincial-
Municipal Properties promulgated in February 1998. This law gave provincial and 
municipal authorities limited autonomy to collect revenues and disburse expenditures of 
their own budgets. In the 1999 national budget, Riels 35 billion were earmarked for 
spending by provincial and municipal administration. 
In conjunction with decentralization, the Government promoted de-concentration to 
streamline authority for budget control at the provincial and municipal levels. This also 
aims to improve efficiency in the budgetary process. Under this system, budget 
disbursements by provincial departments of line ministries requires the approval of 
provincial governors, and must go through the provincial treasury. The Government 
transferred approval authority from provincial governors to directors of provincial 
departments of line ministries. Anyway, no law or administrative order has yet to be 
enacted, though the current initiative was noted at the Donor Monitoring Meeting in 
October 1999. 
Rationalizing public expenditures 
Cambodia as other developing country, has very limited financial resources for 
public expenditures. So it is very importance to establish a close linkage between 
planning medium to long-term development strategies and public expenditure programs 
under the national budget. 
The Government has developed a medium-term plan and strategies under its 
National Program to Rehabilitate and Develop Cambodia (NPRDC), the Socio-
Economic Development Plan (SEDP) 1996-2000, and its 3rd Public Investment Program 
(PIP) 1998-2000. The Ministry of Economy and Finance has introduced the Public 
Expenditure Program (PEP) in the year 2000 budget. The requirements for investment 
and recurrent costs set out by above plans are incorporated into the annual budget. The 
year 2000 budget was prepared within this framework and provides estimates of annual 
budgets for at least three consecutive years as annexes to the budget.  
Another coordination mechanism to rationalize public expenditures is the Public 
Investment Management System (PIMS) was introduced by Council for Development 
of Cambodia (CDC) in 1998. This was intended to establish the coherence and 
complimentary of separate capital budgeting activities among government agencies 
such as Council for Development of Cambodia, Ministry of Planning, Ministry of 
Economy and Finance, and other line ministries. Since the capital budgeting process 
involves planning, programming, budgeting, and monitoring by several agencies, it is 
very important for these agencies to coordinate. The Government also recognized the 
need to further strengthen the capacity of line ministries to implement the Public 
Investment Program. 
The coordination among aid agencies is a key element to rationalizing public 
expenditures, especially through technical assistance to develop the capacity of 
ministries. 
 4-3-Key Issues of Public Finance Reform 
Those key issues are: 
1- Building human resources to carry out financial devolution 
2- Need for political commitment to boost public revenues, and  
3- Need for initiatives by the Government to coordinate external assistance 
Building human resources to carry out financial devolution 
Experiences with reforms suggested that a devolution of financial authority is key to 
modernizing public finance management in Cambodia. The excessively centralized 
public finance system under the Organic Budget Law of 1993 achieved fiscal discipline 
by sacrificing allocative and technical efficiency in the budgetary process. The 
Government recognized the problem and has already taken important steps toward 
financial devolution. A major challenge facing the Government is to enhance efficiency 
of the budgetary process without compromising fiscal discipline. Overall, the public 
expenditure system ought to shift from a pre-audit to a post-audit system. More 
responsibilities will need to devolve to spending units to give autonomy and flexibility 
for their spending allocation. Audit has to be undertaken after budgets have been spent. 
This will improve the efficiency of the budgetary process without compromising fiscal 
discipline. 
An important pre-condition for the success of a post-audit system is the capacity of 
spending units to carry out financial and accounting management. In short, the 
development of human resources is the key for the success of a post-audit system. It has 
to keep up with the pace of financial devolution if fiscal discipline is to be maintained.  
In addition to increase salaries to retain competent people full-time, the need is to 
train finance officers at all levels of the Government is clear. 
The need for political commitment to boost customs and non-tax revenues 
The Government tried to further expand the domestic tax base for the Value-Added 
Tax to maximize the Value-Added Tax’s contribution to enhancing domestic tax 
revenues. Despite the Ministry of Economy and Finance tried very hard, however, 
revenue-enhancing measures in others areas as well as customs revenues and non-tax 
such as forestry, and sales income from public property, revenues from post and 
telecommunications have produced improvement a little bit. 
All non-tax revenue collection the Ministry of Economy and Finance need to 
cooperate with other ministries to collect these revenues. By the way line ministries can 
do by themselves because coordination is beyond their jurisdiction. Strong political 
commitment at higher levels within line ministries is needed for a coordination 
mechanism to perform its expected role. So the presence of a strong political 
commitment at the highest level to tackle powerful vested interests is the critical pre-
condition if the Government is serious about boosting non-tax revenues. 
Need for the initiative of the Government to coordinate external assistance 
The Government built institutional and human resource capacities to link medium-
term development plans and objectives to annual budgets. The case in point is the 
development of systems such as the public Investment Management System and Public 
Expenditure Program. This helped the Government plan annual budgets that are directly 
and rationally linked to achieve medium to long-term development goals. This also 
provided the Government with useful information to identify and prioritize aid-funded 
projects in the future. Furthermore, this helped rationalize annual public expenditures, 
especially capital expenditures that have been suggested and requested by aid agencies.  
The recent initiative by aid agencies to coordinate projects funded by them at the 
sectoral level, using tools such as a Sector-wide Approach Program is highly relevant to 
rationalizing public expenditures. While the importance of aid coordination can not be 
overemphasized, it might be also important to recognize its inherent limitations. It is 
natural that each aid agency wants to maintain the freedom to select projects. For 
example in 1999 the World Bank pointed out, “ the effective subordination of donor 
activities to mutually negotiated sector-wide strategies would be not easy and there 
would be problems of agreements among individual donors regarding responsibility for 
specific inputs and outcomes”. 
Ultimately, it was Cambodia that owns all aid funded projects. So the Government, 
as the executive body, should play the key role in identifying and prioritizing aid-funded 
projects in collaboration with aid agencies. The Government was already taking 
important steps to develop mechanism to do so. It was suggested that these mechanisms 
be further developed and external assistance be gradually shifted from aid-driven 
toward a Cambodian-driven basis. The Government-driven process of reform will only 
be effective to the extent that the Government is able to improve its governance 
practices to be more transparent, accountable and open to participation from non-
government sector.  
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Decentralization 
5-1-The Local Governance Reforms 
The Government is in process of planning potentially major reforms in 
decentralization in connection with the upcoming election to select members of 
commune councils for all communes in Cambodia. The commune elections was held in 
February 3, 2002, decentralization is the policy foundation for the law on commune 
Administrative Management. The commune chiefs have to elect every five years as 
general election, to replace the current system of appointed commune chiefs in 
Cambodia’s 1,621 communes. Commune councils will have responsibility for 
promoting social and economic development, facilitating the delivery of certain services, 
including social services, promoting a healthy, safe, and peaceful environment for local 
citizens, protecting natural resources, and drafting and implementing development plans 
for their respective communes. The councils will also serve as agents of the national 
Government on certain matters. They will not have authority with respect to the judicial 
system, national defense, foreign affairs, postal services, national monetary or policies, 
and forestry, national parks, or other areas were protected by law. 
The Ministry of Interior officials have discussed plans to provide funds directly to 
the commune councils from the national treasury. The Law also stipulates that fees for 
carrying out duties as agents of the Government may be paid to commune councils. 
Related to development planning. The law described in some detail the duties of the 
commune councils for the preparation, adoption, and implementation of commune 
development plans. However, the Ministry of Interior is responsible for ensuring that 
commune development plans meet the Law’s requirements and will instruct commune 
councils on how to implement the plans as well as to monitor, control, and evaluate the 
use of capital funds for the commune development plan. The Ministry of Interior also 
has the power to instruct the commune chief on the division of duties between the 
various deputies on the council. 
The Ministry of Interior officials expressed little concern over the possibility of 
interference by higher officials in the commune councils. In their opinion, all levels of 
government have to respect the law and the powers it grants the commune councils. 
Decentralization of political and administrative powers to the commune level is also 
likely to carry economic implications. “ For a village, proximity to centers of 
administrative and political power are important factors in garnering additional 
resources for its economic development”. Thus, successful decentralization of powers to 
the commune level, through a bold law on Commune Administrative Management, and 
an increased administrative role for communes has the potential for promoting the 
economic development of poor villages previously far from any centers of provincial or 
national government.  
5-2-Decentralization of Fiscal/Financial Power 
A more significant reform in decentralized finance is the law on Financial 
Procedures and Provincial Multiple Properties. It was enacted in February 1998, the 
Law is intended to clarify the responsibilities of provincial governors for revenue 
collection and budgeting while also providing limited powers to raise and retain 
revenues locally.  
The Law has confirmed that governors are responsible for collecting all fiscal and 
non-fiscal revenues in their respective provinces. It enabled the provinces to collect and 
keep certain minor taxes such as vehicle taxes, ferry transport fees, taxes on vacant land, 
and fees for the sale of power and water. Since the scope for raising revenues at the 
provincial level is very limited under the law, revenues from such taxes are unlikely to 
be large, or directed toward financing local development. One should expect revenues to 
be spent at the provincial level for administrative functions, and not in support of 
development projects at the commune or village level. The law, once implemented, will 
be an important first step in the decentralization of fiscal authority and financial power 
to provinces.  
 
CHAPTER SIX 
Conclusion and Remarks:  
In the last decade Cambodia had met very difficult transition of its political, 
economic and social systems. Cambodian post-conflict reconciliation among divided 
Cambodian citizens adds an extra dimension of complexity to the transitional problems. 
In the term of the difficult transition, the structure of governance has to be changed and 
strengthened to respond to the adjustment roles of, and the needs and expectations for 
the State.  
During the last decade the challenges facing Cambodia, the leaders and authorities 
tried to rebuild and develop the nation. However, some of the critical issues of 
governance that can be positively or negatively impact the development process in 
Cambodia. The government is on processing of the reform, to promote good governance, 
government has to consider several concrete actions such as government has to 
identifies and suggests for Asian Development Bank and its development partners some 
priority areas of assistance to promote good governance. The importance of good 
governance for Cambodia can not be overstated. Good governance is not merely for the 
improvement of welfare of Cambodian people. It is an increasingly important criteria 
used by business, international organizations, international credit rating agencies, and 
aid agencies in deciding where to put their money. 
International business will put long-term investment in countries that possess 
competitive advantages in good governance and anti-corruption efficiency. Therefore, it 
is imperative to promote good governance if Cambodia wants to attract long-term 
investment in competition with neighboring countries. International lending institutions 
such as Asian Development Bank, the World Bank. And the International Monetary 
Fund will increasingly use good governance as a critical factor for their lending 
schemes. It is clear that Cambodia needs official grants and loans in the coming decade 
to meet financial needs for public development projects. The Government tried to 
enhance good governance will provide a favorable condition for the negotiation with 
those institutions. 
The Government well reorganizes the importance of good governance, and has 
recently launched ambitious reform programs in some priority areas. The biggest 
challenge facing the Government now is to translate its commitments into sustained 
actions. While many challenges of good governance still lie ahead, the commitment 
demonstrated by the Government and the achievements made to date are heartening and 
inspire optimism for Cambodia’s future.  
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